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OF TAXES AND DUTIES: TAXING THE SYSTEM WITH PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'
TAX OBLIGATIONS
by
Kenneth H. Ryesky*
I. INTRODUCTION
Clearly, the tax laws in America are growing increasingly complex.' The tax
system has steadily become more intricate despite Presidential acknowledgment
more than a decade ago that "[t]he system is too complicated." 2 Yet, the tax laws
* B.B.A., Temple University, 1977; M.B.A., La Salle University, 1982; J.D., Temple
University, 1986; M.L.S. degree candidate, Queens College CUNY; currently a solo
practitioner Attorney in East Northport, NY; Adjunct Assistant Professor, Department of
Accounting & Information Systems, Queens College CUNY, Flushing, NY and Adjunct
Assistant Professor, Department of Business Management, Molloy College, Rockville
Centre, NY; formerly Estate Tax Attorney, Internal Revenue Service, Manhattan District.
See, e.g., Martin A. Sullivan, More Complexity, Not Less, Likely from This Year's Tax
Bill, TAx NoTES TODAY, June 20, 1997, available in LEXIS 97 TNT 119-11; see also Marie
Cocco, Capitalizing on the Erosion of Equitable Taxation, NEWSDAY June 19, 1997, atA53;
Vicky Tsilas, New Tax Expenditures Outnumber Repealed Ones JCT Forecast Shows, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Dec. 10, 1996, available in LEXIS 96 TNT 239-7.
The familiar UNITED STATES CODE SERVICE (U.S.C.S.) series, initially published by
Lawyers Cooperative Publishing and now absorbed into the West Group publishing
conglomerate, annually issues Title 26 of the United States Code (which is the Internal
Revenue Code) in a paperback form instead of the hard bound form used for the other Titles.
The other titles can remain useful with an annual pocket part supplement, while Title 26
requires a complete annual revision in order to keep current with the statutory changes and
case law developments.
The familiar U.S.C.C.A.N. annual edition of the Internal Revenue Code (sometimes
referred to as the "Red I.R.C.") has grown from a single volume of 1,930 pages in the 1976
edition to two volumes of 1,330 and 1,318 pages, respectively, for the 1997 edition. The
U.S.C.C.A.N. companion Federal tax regulations publication ("Red Tax Regs") has grown
even more dramatically over the same period, from two volumes totaling 4,508 pages in
1976 to five volumes of 1,804, 1,707, 1,582, 1,836 and 1,523 pages, respectively, in 1997.
The foregoing figures do not include the pages comprising the index or "last minute"
materials.
2 President Ronald W. Reagan, The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for
Fairness, Growth and Simplicity 1 (May 1985)[emphasis in original]; see also President
Ronald W. Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on Economic Growth, PUB. PAPERS 73, 75
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grow increasingly complex and the system becomes more inefficient with each
passing year,3 despite acknowledgement from various Governmental officials of the
problems associated with tax law complexity.4
Governmental agencies, including and especially those involved in the taxation
function, have compelling reasons to insist that individuals in their employ comply
with the laws of the land, including the personal tax requirements.5 As tax law
complexity increases, so does the general propensity for noncompliance.6 The
governmental agencies are thus confronted with increasing volumes of disciplinary
issues relating to employee tax obligations. This article will explore how the
various types of governmental agencies deal with enforcing compliance by their
employees with personal taxation obligations, and will discuss how fallout from the
(Jan. 26, 1985) ("We must follow through on the policies that have given us 25 months of
economic growth by simplifying our cumbersome tax codes...").
Presidents before (and since) Reagan have likewise expressed high aspirations to
simplify American tax laws. See, e.g., President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Annual Budget
Message to Congress: Fiscal Year 1960, PUB. PAPERS 36, 41 (Jan. 19, 1959) ("As the
budget permits, additional reforms should be undertaken... wherever feasible to simplify
the [tax] laws.").
' Cf. 2 IBN KHALDUN, MUQADDIMAH 89 (F. Rosenthal, trans. Bollingen Ser. XLIII,
Pantheon Books, 1958) (c. 1377) (Pagination in original Arabic version: II, 79) ("It should
be known that at the beginning of the dynasty, taxation yields a large revenue from small
assessments. At the end of the dynasty, taxation yields a small revenue from large
assessments.").
4 See, e.g. GEN. AccT. OFF., PUB. No. GAO/T-GGD-96-100, TAx SYSTEM: ISSUES IN
TAx COMPLIANCE BuRDEN 4-5 (1996), available in LEXIS 96 TNT 67-20. (stating that the
complexity of the Internal Revenue Code, coupled with frequent legislative changes, lead
to taxpayer confusion, noncompliance, and impediment of IRS's ability to enforce the tax
laws); "A taxpaying public that doesn't understand the law is a taxpaying public that can't
comply with the law." Asides: Tax Revision, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 1987, p. 32, col. 1
(quoting Lawrence Gibbs, former Internal Revenue Commissioner); Tom Herman, Tax
Report: Tax-Law Complexity and Poor IRS Service Draw Fire from an IRS Official, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 12, 1997, at A1, (IRS Taxpayer Advocate Lee R. Monks comments on tax law
complexity as cause of most taxpayer problems with the IRS); see also PRESIDENT'S TAX
PROPOSALS, supra note 2; Shirley D. Peterson, Death to the Tax Code, N.Y. TIMES, July 29,
1995, at A2 (Op-Ed page opinion by a former Commissioner of Internal Revenue); Robert
Fresco, Tax Schedule Dfor Dammit!, NEwSDAY, Feb. 13, 1998, at A4 (Robert Kobel, long
time Public Affairs Officer for IRS Brooklyn District, conceded that even he had trouble
understanding the new rules for Schedule D of Form 1040.).
' See infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
6 See supra note 4 and accompanying text; infra notes 96-107, 142 and accompanying
text.
350 [Vol. 31:3,4
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tax law arena affects the efficiency of government as compliance with the tax laws
become increasingly difficult, confusing, and ambiguous.
II. THE STANDARDS TO WHICH PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ARE HELD
A. The General Duty to File Tax Returns
In the oft-quoted words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "[t]axes are what we
pay for civilized society."7 The Internal Revenue Code unequivocally requires
individuals whose income exceeds a relatively low threshold to timely file their
Federal incometax returns.' Failure to do so can bring significant consequences to
7 Compaifa General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S.
87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Holmes's insightful words have
frequently been quoted in court decisions, in speeches, and in introductions and epigraphs
to taxation treatises. See e.g., Spates v. Montgomery County, 590 A.2d 1074, 1075 (Md.
App. 1991); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization and
Assessment, 466 N.W.2d 461, 472 (Neb. 1991); City of Philadelphia v. Austin, 429 A.2d
568,573 (N.J. 1981) affg 407 A.2d 568 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1979); 142 CONG. REC. S7754 (July
11, 1996) (Remarks of Sen. Baucus regarding the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2); Louis
EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION 5 (1961); DANIEL Q. PosiN, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION p. vii (2d ed. 1993); SIDNEY RATNER, AMERICAN TAXATION: ITS HISTORY AS A
SOCIAL FORCE IN DEMOCRACY 17 (1942); Lawrence Summers, Deputy Secretary of the
Treasury, Building a Tax System for the 21Sf Century (ABA Tax Section Annual Meeting,
Aug. 3, 1996), reprinted in Summers Addresses ABA Tax Section on Tax Reform, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Aug. 6, 1996, available in LEXIS 96 TNT 153-38. The quotation, for all
its profound sagacity, is in fact dictum from a dissenting opinion.
In addition to its precedential value as an interpretation of American tax law and its
literary value for Mr. Justice Holmes' gem words of wisdom (not necessarily in that order
of importance), the Compafia General de Tabacos case is of historical interest as an artifact
from the period when the Philippine Islands were under United States sovereignty
(1898-1946).
8 I.R.C. § 6012 (West 1998). The specific dollar amount varies from year to year and
is dependent upon a taxpayer's filing status which must be determined with reference to
other sections of the Internal Revenue Code such as I.R.C. § 151(d) (exemption amount),
I.R.C. § 63(c) (standard deduction), I.R.C. § 7703 (definition of marital status). Moreover,
the exemption amount set forth in I.R.C. § 151 (d) is indexed to economic parameters which
vary from year to year, and which require an annual administrative determination of the
particular dollar amount.
For the 1997 tax year, the filing threshold ranged from $2,650 for married taxpayers
filing separately to $13,800 for married spouses, both over age 65, filing a joint tax return.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PuB. NO. 17, YOuR FEDERAL INCOME TAX 5 (1997). For the
prior tax year, 1996, the filing threshold ranged from $2,550 for married taxpayers filing
1998]
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the individual, both civil9 and criminal. 0 Most states have analogous requirements
for their own taxes."
The American system of taxation is based upon self-assessment in the initial
filing of the return and calculation of the tax. 12 Such a system can operate only
through the enforcement of "strict filing standards."' 3 Truthfulness on the part of
the taxpayer is most imperative. 4
Every instance of an individual failing to properly file and pay his or her taxes
necessarily shifts additional tax burden to the shoulders of the law-abiding
taxpayers.' 5 It must nevertheless be remembered that "[a]ny one may so arrange
his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that
pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to
increase one's taxes."' 6 Indeed, one need not be enthusiastic about paying one's
taxes.17 The universal dislike for paying taxes (and for the governmental authorities
separately to $13,400 for married spouses, both over age 65, filing a joint tax return.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUB. No. 17, YOUR FEDERAL INCOME TAX 8 (1996).
9 I.R.C. § 6651 (West 1998).
'o See, e.g., I.R.C. §§7201 and 7203 (West 1998).
" See, e.g., MD. CODEANN.,TAX-GEN. §§ 13-701, 13-1001 to 13-1003 (1997); N.Y.
TAx LAW §§ 685, 1801-05 (McKinney 1987); 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7352, 7353
(West 1990).
12 I.R.C. § 6501(a)(1) (West 1998).
'3 United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 249 (1985).
14 United States v. Taylor, 574 F.2d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1978), reh'g denied, 576 F.2d
931 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 893 (1978); Sheldon S. Cohen, Morality and the
American Tax System, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 839 (1966); see also United States v.
Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141,145 (1975); cf. PLATO, THEREPUBLIC AND OTHER WORKS 27 (B.
Jowett, trans.) (DoubleDay Dolphin 1982) ("[W]here there is an income tax, the just man
will pay more and the unjust less on the same amount of income."). In the Rouse translation
of the same work, the passage is rendered: "[W]hen there are taxes and contributions, the
just man will pay more and the unjust less from an equal estate." GREAT DIALOGUES OF
PLATO 142 (Eric H. Warmington & Philip G. Rouse, eds. 1956).
'5 See, e.g., United States v. Romero, 640 F.2d 1014, 1016 (9th Cir. 1981); President
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Annual Budget Message to Congress: Fiscal Year 1961, PUB.
PAPERS 37, 101 (Jan. 15, 1960).
16 Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935);
cf. Estate of Trompeter v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1653,1660 (1998) ("One is not
required to arrange his or her affairs so that the government will receive more tax than it is
rightfully owed. Nor is it fraudulent to construe an ambiguous law in a manner that is
adverse to the government.").
17 One may even write notes and letters expressing disparagement for the IRS. Belli v.
[Vol. 31:3,4
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who collect taxes) is certainly an age old human sentiment., 8
Notwithstanding the extremely low popularity of the taxation process, it
remains an individual's incumbent duty to timely file and pay income taxes. Every
American citizen and/or resident thus has a legal duty to voluntarily file tax returns
and to pay taxes owing. 19
Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1172, 1181 (1989). But cf. DAVID BURNHAM, A LAW
UNTO ITSELF 70-79 (1989) (describing incidents of excesses and abuses by the IRS against
those expressing a desire to not pay taxes.).
18 "Of all debts, men are least willing to pay the taxes." RALPH WALDO EMERSON,
Politics, in ESSAYS (1844), reprinted in RALPH WALDO EMERSON, ESSAYS & LECTURES at
567 (Joel Porte, ed. 1983), and in 5 THE HARVARD CLASSICS: ESSAYS AND ENGLISH TRAITS
at 247 (Chas. W. Eliot, ed. 1909).
If one is to accept Christian scripture, the apostle Matthew was a publican, a tax collector
for the Roman Empire. Matthew 10:3. That popular work records the sentiment of the time
which clearly viewed publicans as a most unpopular group. See, e.g., Matthew 11:19;
21:31-32; Mark 2:15; Luke 7:34.
When Lawrence Gibbs became the United States Commissioner of Internal Revenue in
1986, he reportedly was asked by his son: "Well Dad, how do you feel being the most
disliked person in America?" Tax Notes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1994, at A1.
19 The American taxation system is based upon voluntary compliance by the taxpayer,
and a key element of the IRS mission is to foster voluntary compliance with the tax laws.
See Donald C. Alexander, Commissioner, Directive: Organization and Functions of the IRS
§ 1111.1 (Mar. 25, 1974), reprinted in 39 Fed. Reg. 11,572 (1974); see also 1989-2 C.B.
at ii.
"Voluntary" compliance in the context of the tax laws does have an implied element of
sheathed compulsion. See, e.g., INTERNALREVENUE SERVICE, PUB. No. 1273, GUIDETO THE
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE FOR CONGRESSIONAL STAFF at4 (1996) (SuDoc No. T22.44/2:
1273/996):
Implicit in the [Internal Revenue] Code is Congress' understanding that it
expects voluntary compliance with the tax laws. This means that taxpayers are
expected to comply with the law without being compelled to do so by action of a
federal agent; it does not mean that the taxpayer is free to decide whether or not to
comply with the law.
Id.; cf. 2 EDWARD GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE
199 (J. B. Bury, Ed., Methuen & Co., Ltd., London, 6th ed. 1913) (1788), also published
as 2 EDWARD GIBBON, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 558 (Modem
Library, N.Y., n.d. [c. 1932]):
The secret wealth of commerce, and the precarious profits of art or labour, are
susceptible only of a discretionary valuation, which is seldom disadvantageous to
the interest of the treasury; and as the person of the trader supplies the want of a
visible and permanent security, the payment of the imposition, which, in the case
1998]
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B. The Governmental Interest in Employees' Personal Conduct
The Government's interest in the personal conduct of its employees must be
weighed against the employees' personal rights, including those of privacy and due
process. It is, of course, axiomatic that a governmental agency can discipline its
employees for job-related misbehavior, and indeed, the Government has been
upheld in disciplining its employees for diverse offenses, including but in no way
limited to theft, ° making false statements on employment applications, 21 failure to
render required reports of personal financial transactions,22 and falsification of
travel vouchers and/or time records.23
It is also well established that the Government must, in order to discipline an
employee for off-duty conduct, articulate a "nexus" between the conduct and a
governmental interest whereby the misconduct adversely impacts the employee's
performance, discredits the Government, or impedes the efficiency of the
governmental agency. 24 Merely because off-duty conduct is objectionable does not
of a land-tax, may be obtained by the seizure of property, can rarely be extorted by
any other means than those of corporal punishments.
Id.; MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH: SHEKALIM ch. 1, [ 9 at 94-95 (Philip Birnbaum, trans.,
Hebrew Publ. Co., NY, 1967) (c. 1180) (discussing the collection of the half-shekel tax
during the existence of the Temple in Jerusalem):
On the first of Adar announcement is made concerning the payment of shekel
dues, so that each individual may prepare his half-shekel and be ready to pay it.
On the fifteenth of Adar, the money-changers sit down in each town and gently
request everyone to pay. They accept from everyone who offers them the
half-shekel, without using compulsion against anyone who does not. On the
twenty-fifth of Adar, they sit down in the Temple to enforce collection. From then
on, payment is obtained by force from those who have not yet paid. Anyone who
refuses to pay is subjected to compulsion by levy; a pledge is taken from him
forcibly, even the garment he is wearing.
Id.; Rita Zeidner, From Grizzly to Cuddly, Gov'T EXECUTIVE MAG., Oct. 1992, at 12, 17
(discussing IRS public relations initiatives and quoting Natwar Gandhi, Associate Director
for Tax Policy, U.S. General Accounting Office: "Kind words can do a lot, but kind words
and a gun can go a lot further.").
2' See, e.g., Sears v. Dept. of the Navy, 680 F.2d 863 (1st Cir. 1982).
21 See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 434 F.2d 1346 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
22 See, e.g., Kandall v. United States, 186 Ct. Cl. 900,904 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
837 (1969).
23 See, e.g., Byrnes v. United States, 553 F.2d 105 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Pascal v. United
States, 543 F.2d 1284 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Birnholz v. United States, 199 Ct. Cl. 532 (1972).
24 E.g., Phillips v. Bergland, 586 F.2d 1007, 1010-11 (4th Cir. 1978); 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a)
(1994) (Federal civil service employees may not be disciplined except, " [F]or such cause
[Vol. 31:3,4
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give the Government the right to discipline; the Government must also show that
the objectionable behavior has a clearly adverse effect upon the agency's mission
or operation. Moreover, the government is held to various due process matters,
including adherence to its own rules and procedures when it imposes discipline
upon its employees.26
Notwithstanding the Government's burden of showing the nexus, Government
employees are generally held to a somewhat higher standard in their personal
actions than are members of the general public. "The peculiar relationship of
employer-employee permits the government, when it acts as employer, to exact
more of its employees than it may require of the general public. 27 Indeed, as far
back as the written records reach, governments have imposed upon their servants
more stringent restrictions and regulations regarding the conduct of personal affairs
than have been imposed upon the ordinary citizens and subjects.28 Moreover, a
as will promote the efficiency of the service.").
Not content to rely upon statute and case law alone, some Federal Government unions
have apparently seen fit to specify the nexus requirement in collective bargaining
agreements. See e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, NATIONAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AND NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION ("NORD I1")
Arts. 38.1(C) at p. 59 and 39.1(C) at p. 61 (IRS Document 6647, July 1989) (Adverse
actions and disciplinary actions not to be taken against employees "except for such cause
as will promote the efficiency of the [Internal Revenue Service]."
The nexus requirement also applies to the various State governments as well. See, e.g.
Ramirez v. State Personnel Bd., 251 Cal. Rptr. 9 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Craddolph v.
Ackerman, 385 N.E.2d 1091 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978); Commonwealth Office of the Atty. Gen.
v. Colbert, 598 A.2d 344 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991), appeal granted, 606 A.2d 903 (Pa. 1992),
appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 619 A.2d 1062 (Pa. 1993).
25 Compare Wathen v. United States, 527 F.2d 1191, 1201 (Ct. Cl. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 821 (1976) (upholding removal of employee who, in highly publicized case, was
acquitted by reason of insanity of murdering his mistress), with Major v. Hampton, 413 F.
Supp. 66, 71 (E.D. La. 1976) (refusing to uphold removal of an employee where the
employee rented a tryst apartment in the French Quarter of New Orleans, "the city that care
forgot," and where the landlord and neighbors condoned the immoral behavior).
26 See, e.g., Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); Starzec v. United States, 145 Ct. Cl.
25 (1959). The State and local governments must similarly discipline their employees
according to specified and established procedures. See, e.g., Inwang v. Community College
Dist. No. 508, 453 N.E.2d 896 (111. App. Ct. 1983); McGlone v. City of Philadelphia, 535
A.2d 266 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987); Powell v. Brown, 238 S.E.2d 220 (W.Va. 1977).
27 Major v. Hampton, 413 F.Supp. 66, 70 (E.D. La. 1976).
2' See, e.g., CODE OFHAMMURABI, KING OF BABYLON § 38, at25 (R. F. Harper, trans.,
U. of Chicago Press 1904) (circa 2250 B.C.) ("An officer, constable or tax-gatherer shall not
deed to his wife or daughter the field, garden or house, which is his business (i.e., which is
1998]
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particular government agency's nature and mission can dictate an especially
stringent standard of personal conduct on and off the job ,29 and set disciplinary
standards for infractions accordingly.30
There is a special obligation on the part of any governmental employee to
refrain from off-hours conduct which is directly contrary to the key objectives of
the agency by whom he or she is employed.
... [W]here an employee's off-duty behavior is blatantly inconsistent with the
mission of the employer and is known or likely to become known, most any
employer, public or private, however broadminded, would want to fire the
employee and would be reasonable in wanting to do so; and we fimd no evidence
that Congress intended to deny this right to federal agencies.... A customs officer
caught smuggling, an immigration officer caught employing illegal aliens, an IRS
employee who files false income tax returns, a HUD appraiser moonlighting as a
"slumlord" - these are merely the public counterparts of a form of conflict of
interest that is not less serious for not being financial, that would not be tolerated
in the private sector, and that we do not believe Congress meant to sanctify in the
public sector.
31
Indeed, termination of a Federal employee has been upheld for offenses such
as a Department of Housing and Urban Development employee moonlighting as a
his by virtue of his office), nor shall he assign them for debt."). Obviously, taxation
personnel were to be found in the employ of the governing authorities even as far back as
Hammurabi's day.
29 See, e.g., DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CENTER, DISC: WELCOME TO DEFENSE
INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CENTER at 15 (undated publication of Defense Industrial Supply
Center, Phila., PA, handout to new employees, copy on file with author).
We hired you because we believe you have a high level of character and ethical
conduct. You are now in the public service and this means that expectations are
particularly high. In addition, you work for a critical defense organization, and
you are subject to more restrictions and higher standards of conduct than Federal
employees in non-defense agencies.
Id. (emphasis added).
30 U. S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, MANAGER'S HANDBOOK at 94 (1979)
("Sometimes also, your agency's mission will require a more severe penalty for the same
offense than would be warranted at another agency."); For a discussion on special stringency
of conduct expected of employees of the IRS and state taxation agencies, see infra notes 36-
66.
31 Wild v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. 692 F.2d 1129, 1133 (7th Cir.
1982).
[Vol. 31:3,4
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slumlord,32 an Immigration and Naturalization Service employee who hired illegal
aliens, 33 a Customs Officer who used the very illicit drugs his duty was to
intercept, 34 and a purchasing agent who committed theft.35
C. The Tax Compliance Obligations of Public Employees in a Taxation Agency
The very mission of a taxation authority such as the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") or an analogous state governmental agency is to administer the tax laws and
collect taxes.36 In light of their very missions and functions, the IRS and analogous
state governmental agencies have an interest in the tax law compliances of their
respective employees. Nonadherence to the tax laws by taxation authority
employees strains the morale, order and discipline which must be maintained
amongst the ranks of taxation authority personnel in order to ensure the stability of
governmental function.37
32 Id.
33 Wroblaski v. Hampton, 528 F.2d 852, 854-56 (7th Cir. 1976).
34 Masino v. United States, 589 F.2d 1048, 1055-56 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
31 Sears v. Department of the Navy, 680 F.2d 863, 867 (1st Cir. 1982). Theft of
government property by a government employee is a serious offense, but the fact that the
employee was a purchasing agent made his theft of Navy property all the more intolerable.
Id.; cf Portela Gonzalez v. Secretary of the Navy, 913 F.Supp. 122, 128 (D. P. R. 1996),
aff'd, 109 F.3d 74 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding that because the employee in question was the
sales manager at a Navy Exchange, her commission of theft was especially intolerable,
notwithstanding an excellent 29-year employment record).
36 See, e.g. 1995-1 C.B., at ii.
"7 See Brief for Respondent at 55, Kooi v. Chu, 517 N.Y.S. 2d 601, (App. Div. 1987)
(No. 53842) (reproduced on Fiche No. 3-87-466, Micro Copy, Inc., Rochester, NY)
(Affidavit of Roderick G. W. Chu, New York State Commissioner of Taxation & Finance):
All individuals employed by the Department [of Taxation & Finance] are either
directly or indirectly charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing
the State's tax laws. It is vital to the integrity of the Department and to the
equitable, fair, and effective administration of the State's tax laws that all officers
and employees of the Department performing such duties be above reproach with
respect to the requirement to file New York State personal income tax returns
pursuant to Tax Law § 651. Toleration of violation by any such officer or
employee carries with it the risk of a creeping rot within the Department itself, with
a consequent serious adverse effect on the morale of those officers and employees
within the Department who are in full compliance with the tax laws.
Id.; For a further discussion of Kooi, see infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
Discord and laxity amongst taxation personnel has long been known to imperil the
stability of any governmental regime, democratic or otherwise. See 2 IBN KHALDON,
1998]
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Apart from and in addition to the need for concordant order within the ranks of
a taxation authority, public perceptions are obviously vital to fostering the IRS
mission of voluntary tax compliance. 38  "[I]t is important, if not absolutely
necessary, for the integrity and morality of Internal Revenue Service agents to be
above reproach at all times. Their honesty and good character are taken for granted
and must never be compromised. ' 39 "The IRS is rightly concerned with its image
of honesty and integrity. Members of the public, who must turn square comers in
tax matters, demand no less of revenue officers." 4 Thus, the IRS strives to avoid
even the appearance that it will brook any tax law violation by anyone at any level
within its own ranks. Congressional sentiment likewise seems to eschew public
perceptions that the IRS might permit such derelictions of personal duty among its
troops.
42
Accordingly, IRS employees are held to an especially stringent standard to
fulfill their duty to timely file proper tax returns.'3 For one thing, the IRS employee
MUQADDIMAH 123-24 (F. Rosenthal, trans., Bollingen Ser. XLIII, Pantheon Books, 1958)
(c. 1377) (Pagination in original Arabic version: II, 113) ("It becomes common for one tax
collector to denounce another, because of their mutual jealousy and envy.... The dynasty
loses the pomp and magnificence it had possessed through them."); see also 2 M.
ROSTOVTZEFF, THE SOCIAL & ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE HELLENISTIC WORLD 724-26
(1967) (discussing how conflict and chaos among tax collection hierarchy contributed to the
decline and fall of the Ptolemaic dynasty in Egypt).
38 See, e.g., Monaco v. Department of Treasury, I.R.S., 15 M.S.P.R. 727 (M.S.P.B.
1983); Rotolo v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 636 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1980); President Harry
S Truman, Annual Message to Congress: Fiscal Year 1953, PUB. PAPERS 63, 112 (1953)
("The maintenance of public confidence in the tax collection process is essential to our tax
system."); see also IRS Chief Taxed by Bashing ofAgency, NEWSDAY Jan. 9, 1997, at A41
(IRS Commissioner Margaret Milner Richardson, at an interview following the
announcement of her resignation, warned that continued public criticism of the IRS might
adversely affect Americans' willingness to voluntarily comply with the tax laws.).
For further discussion of "voluntary compliance," see supra note 19 and accompanying
text.
3' Kandall v. United States, 186 Ct. Cl. 900, 904 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837
(1969).
40 Birnholz v. United States 199 Ct. Cl. 532, 537 (1972). Notwithstanding the quoted
dictum, the Birnholz case did not specifically entail any tax return or tax payment
irregularities, but did involve, inter alia, the falsification of time reports and travel vouchers
by an attorney-accountant employed by the IRS. Id.
41 Rotolo v. Sys. Protection Bd., 636 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1980).
42 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 104-506, at 52 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1143,
1175.
43 See, e.g., George Guttman, IRS Employees Less Tax Compliant than Officials Would
[Vol. 3 1:3,4
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Rules of Conduct explicitly provide that IRS employees "timely and properly file
all required tax returns,"' and pay their just debts, "especially those imposed by
law, such as Federal, State and local taxes. '45 Noncompliance with their tax duties
is grounds for removal of an IRS employee from the Service. 4 6 Even where
Like, TAx NOTES TODAY, May 3, 1995, at 597, available in LEXIS 95 TNT 86-3:
The IRS believes that, like Caesar's wife, its employees should be above
suspicion. This means employee tax returns must be timely filed, taxes must be
fully paid when due, and there should be no subsequent adjustments that lead to
extra tax being owed or a penalty being assessed, according to Darlene Berthod,
national director of IRS personnel....
Id. ("The Berthod standard is more stringent than that to which the general population is
held .... ."); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
HIGHLIGHTS 1989, PUB. No. 1265 at 21 (1990)
The Internal Revenue Service is a high visibility agency because of its direct
contact with nearly every family in America. This makes IRS employees the
guardian of an institution that is always on-the-line. People tend to expect more
of IRS employees because they are IRS. So does IRS!
Id.; cf., e.g., Taylor v. Department of Justice, 60 M.S.P.R. 686, 693 (M.S.P.B. 1994)
(reducing the penalty for failure to file income tax returns from removal to a 90-day
suspension where appellant was employed by an agency other than the Internal Revenue
Service, and where his duties did not involve the enforcement of the Internal Revenue
Code).
The imposition of a rigid disciplinary regime upon those who administer taxation policy
did not originate with the IRS, and in fact long predates American law. See, e.g., CODE
JUST. 12.62.3 (Gratian & Valentinian 380) in THE CIVIL LAW, v. 15 at 319 (S. P. Scott,
trans., photo. reprint, AMS Press 1973) (1932) "Whenever a collector is accused and
convicted of depredations, he must suffer the penalty prescribed by law, without appealing
to our clemency" Id. (emphasis added).
44 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, RULES OF CONDUCT § 216.7 at 6 (Document 7098)
(May 1989), reprinted in Followup on Investigation of Senior-Level Employee Misconduct
and Mismanagement at the Internal Revenue Service: Hearing before the Committee on
Government Operations, Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee, 101 st
Cong., 2d Sess. 163, 172 (1990) (SuDoc No. Y4.G74/: EM 7/14).
The first page of IRS Document 7098 entails IRS Form 8556 (Rev. 5/89),
"Acknowledgment of Receipt," which provides for written acknowledgment by the
individual IRS employee that he or she received a copy of Document 7098 and is aware of
the personal obligation to become familiar with the contents of the document. Id.
45 Id. § 216.6, at 6.
46 Rotolo v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 636 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1980) (IRS employee
removed for improper deductions and unreported income); Giles v. United States, 553 F.2d
647 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (IRS employee removed for late filing of Federal tax returns); Dargan v.
United States, 529 F.2d 532 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (IRS employee removed for failure to timely file
his returns and failing to report all of his income thereon); Hoover v. United States, 513 F.2d
1998]
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removal from the Service has been found to be overly harsh, the failure of an IRS
employee to file proper tax returns is a serious offense47 for which some form of
punishment is warranted. 48 An IRS employee's improper filing (or nonfiling) of an
analogous state income tax return is equally sanctionable conduct. 49 Moreover, IRS
603 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (IRS employee whose duties entailed screening tax returns for improper
deductions removed for taking improper deductions on his own return); Micali v.
Department of the Treasury, 56 M.S.P.R. 127 (M.S.P.B. 1992), affid, 11 F.3d 1070 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (GS-9 Taxpayer Service Specialist removed for failure to include income of
spouse on joint return for 4 years); see also Hobbs v. United States, 97-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH)
§ 50,965 (S.D. Tex., No. Civ. H-96-4260, 11/3/97) (discharged I.R.S. employee litigating
disclosure issues arising from his discharge for failure to properly file his tax returns and pay
his taxes: in addition to tax irregularities, the I.R.S. employee in question apparently failed
to pay his child support obligations).
47 The failure to timely pay taxes when due is not as serious as failure to file and/or
failure to accurately report one's income. Gibbs v. Dept. of Treasury, 21 M.S.P.R. 646, 650
(M.S.P.B. 1984); Davis v. Dept. of Treasury, 8 M.S.P.R. 317, 321 (M.S.P.B. 1981). The
penalty assessed by the IRS upon a taxpayer for failure to timely file a tax return is 5% per
month or fraction thereof, while the failure to timely pay a tax is 0.5% per month or fraction
thereof. I.R.C. § 6651 (West 1998).
48 Boyce v. United States, 543 F.2d 1290 (Ct. Cl. 1976). The penalty of removal from
the Service was found to be disproportionately harsh under the circumstances in view of the
fact that the employees in question, who failed to timely file, were female GS-2 and GS-3
grade employees who depended upon their respective husbands to file a joint return. Id. at
1291. The court nevertheless acknowledged that some form of punishment must be meted
out to the employees. Id. at 1293.
In determining the appropriate degree of punishment (there being no question as to
whether to punish), it is perfectly appropriate for the IRS and other Federal agencies to hold
higher ranking employees to higher standards. Compare Monterosso v. Department of the
Treasury, 6 M.S.P.R. 684 (M.S.P.B. 1981) (GS-3 mail clerk), with Monaco v. Department
of Treasury, I.R.S., 15 M.S.P.R. 727, 730-31 (M.S.P.B. 1983) (GS-9 employee having
personal contact with taxpayers was removed); see also Gipson v. Veterans Admin., 682
F.2d 1004, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Brewer v. United States Postal Serv., 647 F.2d 1093,
1098 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144, (1982); Caster v. Department of the Army,
62 M.S.P.R. 436 (M.S.P.B. 1994), aff'd sub nom Manning v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 59
F.3d 180 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Federal agencies justified in holding a higher ranking and
supervisory employees to a more stringent standard of conduct).
It is likewise appropriate for State agencies to hold higher ranking employees to higher
standards of conduct. See, e.g., Woodbridge v. Commw. Department of Revenue, 435 A.2d
300, 302 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981).
49 Cf. Danese v. Internal Revenue Serv., 11 M.S.P.R. 97 (M.S.P.B. 1982). In Danese,
the IRS failed to demonstrate that the employee in question did in fact have an obligation
to file a Mississippi state income tax return in view of factual questions, including the
employee's claimed residence in Louisiana. Id. at 99. Had the IRS shown that the
[Vol. 31:3,4
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agents and employees are held to a higher standard when their own tax affairs come
before the courts."0
Though the IRS is in many respects the most visible, feared and despised
branch of the Treasury Department,5' taxation is not the Treasury's sole function. 52
Treasury employees working in nontaxation functions are not subject to public
employee did in fact neglect his state tax filing responsibilities, however, there is little
question that the discipline imposed upon the employee would have been sustained. Id.
Indeed, Federal law statutorily provides that Federal employees who reside and/or are
employed on Federal installations or other Federal areas are not excused by reason thereby
from income tax obligations imposed by the states and/or cities in which such Federal areas
are situated. 4 U.S.C. § 106; see also Application of Thompson, 157 F. Supp. 93 (E.D. Pa.
1957), aff'd sub nom, United States ex rel. Thompson v. Lennox, 258 F.2d 320 (3d Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 931 (1959); Kiker v. Philadelphia, 31 A.2d 289 (Pa. 1943),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 741 (1943).
'0 See, e.g., Beretta v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1467 (1997); Theisen v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1327 (1997); Crismali v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1579 (1995); Goldenberg v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2338 (1993); Addison
v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 3157 (1992); Langer v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1900 (1992), aff'd, 989 F.2d 294 (8th Cir. 1993); Langer v. Commissioner, 59
T.C.M. (CCH) 740 (1990), afftd, 980 F.2d 1198 (8th Cir. 1992); see also Kale v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2854 (1996) (involving tax consequences of
bribes taken by former IRS Agent during his employ with the IRS. The court noted that he
had reached "the highest possible grade allowed to non-management agents," and that he
was fully aware that his conduct was illegal, ergo, a fraud penalty was imposed.).
Interestingly, the courts apparently continue to hold former IRS agents and employees
to a higher standard in the conduct of their personal tax affairs which arise after they depart
from the employ of the IRS. See, e.g., United States v. Nunan, 236 F.2d 576 (2d. Cir. 1956),
cert. denied 353 U.S. 912 (1957); Price v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 1906 (1997),
affid, 142 F.3d 440 (7 Cir. 1998); Grossman v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 845,
882-83 (1996); Sisson v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 200, 202 (1996); Shapiro v.
Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2389 (1994).
The standard to which the courts hold former IRS agents obviously impacts the standard
to which IRS tax examination personnel will hold their former colleagues in personal tax
examination situations.
"' See generally DAVID BuRNHAM, A LAW UNTO ITSELF (1989); see also 142 CONG.
REC. S 10547-49 (daily ed., Sept. 13, 1996) (remarks of Sen. Coverdell).
52 The Treasury's other functional entities include, but are not limited to, the U.S. Secret
Service, Office of Thrift Supervision, the U.S. Mint, Bureau of Printing & Engraving, and
the Comptroller of the Currency, as well as headquarters administrative staff functions. See,
e.g., THE UNITED STATES GOV'T MANUAL 1997/1998, at 438-51 (1996), available in 1996
WL 616334.
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image and internal order concerns in quite the same way as their colleagues at the
IRS. On the other hand, Treasury officials who occupy high and visible positions
are subject to heightened tax compliance obligations by virtue of holding such
positions.54
The same considerations for holding IRS agents to a stringent standard in their
personal tax affairs also apply to employees of state and local taxation authorities.
In one illustrative case, Kooi v. Chu, 55 the New York State Department of Taxation
and Finance, under a new Commissioner who sought to reinvigorate a policy grown
lax, implemented a 3-step process with respect to those of its employees it
identified as nonfilers of New York State Income Tax returns: first, a relatively
friendly reminder letter was sent to all identified nonfiler employees, who were
given the opportunity to file or to explain the apparent nonfiling; second, those who
did not respond to the first step were called in for interview, with simultaneous
imposition of a one month suspension and a specified deadline by which to comply
with the filing requirements; third, those who did not comply by the deadline would
be dismissed. Despite the clear opportunity for nonfilers to file delinquent returns
and thus continue their employment, thirty five Department employees failed to so
file after the clearly specified deadline, including eleven Tax Compliance Agents,
three Excise Tax Investigators and four Audit Clerks.56 These employees have an
" But see, Crawford v. Department of the Treasury, 56 M.S.P.R. 224, 237 (M.S.P.B.
1993) (ordering a lesser degree of discipline for a Treasury Department police officer who
failed to file tax returns than he would have received had he been working in a taxation
function).
14 See, e.g., Former United States Treasurer Gets Prison Term for Tax Fraud, NEW
YORK TIMES, Sept. 14, 1996, at A 12. Former United States Treasurer Catalina Villalpando
was sentenced to prison time for a tax fraud conviction. Id. The sentencing judge declined
to impose an alternative to incarceration, finding that Ms. Villalpando' s position imposed
a special duty upon her to personally comply with the tax laws. Id.; cf. In re Anderson, 536
N.Y.S. 2d 765 (App. Div. 1989). In disbarring an attorney from practice in New York, the
Court weighed as particularly egregious his violations of the federal banking laws which the
attorney, when he previously occupied the Cabinet post of Secretary of the Treasury, had
the specific duty to apply and enforce. Id. Obviously, a current or former Secretary of the
Treasury would be held to similar stringencies if he or she were to violate the Internal
Revenue Code, another key statute which the Secretary of the Treasury has the duty to apply
and enforce. See supra note 48 (regarding higher-ranking employees being held to more
stringent standards.).
" 517 N.Y.S. 2d 601, 602-03 (App. Div. 1987); see also Brief for Respondent at 49-50,
Kooi (No. 53842), microformed on Fiche No. 3-87-466 (Micro Copy, Inc., Rochester, NY)
(Affidavit of Roderick G. W. Chu).
56 Brief for Respondent at 28-29, Kooi (No. 53842).
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official duty to "directly monitor tax compliance by other taxpayers. 5 7 The new
Department administration found it imperative that such employees be removed to
maintain internal order within the Department and public confidence and tax
compliance outside the Department.58
The case of Department ofRevenue v. Smith,59 has a fact pattern which stretches
to the greatest extreme. The Smith case is quite instructional regarding official
policy on the personal tax obligations of the Illinois Department of Revenue, and
the inconsistent enforcement thereof, during the early to mid 1980's. Thomas J.
Smith was not a rank-and-file employee of the Illinois Department of Revenue; he
was a high level supervisor and the liaison between the IRS and the State for the
specific purpose of coordinating tax enforcement.6° Admittedly, Smith knew well
that Department policy required all employees to file their state tax returns and
subjected violators to dismissal, yet Smith failed to file his Federal and State tax
returns for 1982 and 1983.6' The Department of Revenue sought to terminate
Smith's employment, but the Illinois Civil Service Commission reduced the penalty
to a ninety-day suspension, noting the diverse inconsistency with which the
Department had enforced its policy in the past.62
The ninety-day suspension in the Smith case seems, on its face, to be relatively
mild in light of Mr. Smith's rank and responsibilities, and in light of the fact that
the IRS District Director specifically informed the Director of the Illinois
Department of Revenue that the IRS "could no longer work with [Smith] as a
liaison person" in light of Smith's nonfiling of his Federal tax returns.63 However,
as the investigation developed, Mr. Smith was ultimately removed from his position
with the Illinois Department of Revenue, albeit indirectly, via nonreappointment
according to the applicable Illinois civil service laws.
6 4
Smith and Kooi stand together for government agency executives as contrasting
exemplars in the craft of public personnel administration. On one hand, the Illinois
7 Id. at 54.
58 See id. at 55-56.
59 501 N.E.2d 1370 (111. App. 1986), appeal denied, 508 N.E.2d 726 (111. 1987).
60 Id. at 1373.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 1379.
63 Id. at 1375.
64 See Smith v. United States, 723 F. Supp. 1300, 1303 (C.D. Ill. 1989), modified on
other grounds, 964 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1067, (1993) (Smith
unsuccessfully sued the IRS District Director for disclosing Smith's tax return information
to Smith's superiors at the Illinois Department of Revenue.).
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Department of Revenue's lax and inconsistent enforcement practices in Smith made
it difficult for that agency to effect a clean and orderly termination of an errant,
high-level employee whose egregious misbehavior cried out for swift, visible, and
definitive punishment. On the other hand, the New York State Department of
Taxation and Finance's systematic, proactive and uniformly-applied initiative to
reanimate its disused rules gave it sufficient underpinning to begin strict
enforcement of its stated policies without contramand by an appellate tribunal.
Taxation personnel in other states seem to be effectively held, to varying
degrees, to an enhanced standard with respect to their personal tax affairs.65 Public
policy considerations obviously impart a special cogency for bureaucrats working
in taxation bureaucracies to comply with tax laws.
D. The Tax Compliance Obligations of Public Employees in Other Agencies
Personal tax compliance lapses of public servants employed by nontaxation
agencies do not carry as many of the negative implications as when committed by
65 Responses to informal Internet e-mail inquiries by the author seem to confirm that the
various State taxation authorities require their employees to file their tax returns, and seem
to enforce that requirement to varying extents from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. E.g., E-mail
from Carol Deatherage, Arizona Department of Revenue (position and rank unknown) to
Kenneth Ryesky, Adjunct Assistant Professor, Queens College CUNY (Aug. 30, 1996) (on
file with author). ("In the state of Arizona it is mandatory that all Dept. of Revenue
employees files [sic] their taxes. It is checked each year to make sure we are filed, [sic] and
failure to file is grounds for termination. Before we are hired we have a background check
which includes filing of taxes."); E-mail from Madelon Barton, State of Washington,
Department of Revenue (position and rank unknown) to Kenneth Ryesky, Adjunct Assistant
Professor, Queens College CUNY (Sept. 26, 1996) (on file with author). (The State of
Washington has no income tax, but state employees who operate their own businesses may
be disciplined for not complying with business taxation requirements.); E-mail from Ellen
Rhorer, Louisiana Department of Revenue & Taxation (position and rank unknown) to
Kenneth Ryesky, Adjunct Assistant Professor, Queens College CUNY (Sept. 20, 1996) (on
file with author). (The Department's Standards of Conduct for Employees require that all
Federal and state tax returns be timely filed and paid, and in the case of a good faith dispute,
an appeal must be pending before the appropriate authority. Filing history is verified for
new employees.); E-mail from Thomas Fonfara, Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue (Executive
Assistant) to Kenneth Ryesky, Adjunct Assistant Professor, Queens College CUNY (Sept.
19, 1996) (on file with author). ("The Wisconsin Department of Revenue does require all
employees, at risk of discipline, to file required tax returns. While rare, we have disciplined
employees, ranging from verbal warnings to termination, for violation of work rule #1,
'Failure to file all required Wisconsin tax forms in a timely manner.' ").
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employees of the IRS or state taxation authorities.66 Nevertheless, the government
does have the right to expect all of its employees to comply with the tax laws.
Federal employees in the Executive Branch are specifically expected to meet their
just financial obligations, 67 including and especially their Federal, State and local
taxes.68 The IRS reportedly assigns a special selection code to classify the tax
66 See, e.g., Taylor v. Department of Justice, 60 M.S.P.R. 686, 693 (M.S.P.B. 1994)
(finding that because appellant was employed by an agency other than the IRS, the Board
reduced the penalty for failure to file income tax returns from removal to a ninety-day
suspension); Mitchell v. United States Postal Serv., 32 M.S.P.R. 362, 365-66. (M.S.P.B.
1987) (evading taxes and submitting false W-4 Forms found not to be an embarrassment to
the Postal Service, thus reducing penalty from removal to sixty-day suspension).
67 Phillips v. General Servs. Admin., 878 F.2d 370, 374 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (upholding
reprimand of Federal employee whose credit card account was 120 days delinquent); 5
C.F.R. § 2635.809 (1996).
It is noteworthy that the credit card in the Phillips case was a special Diners Club card
issued to Federal employees and intended for the charging of reimbursable official expenses,
with the individual employee being liable to Diners Club for all charges made against the
account and which, if the charges were proper, would be reimbursed by the Government to
the employee in time to pay the Diner's Club bill without any delinquency. Phillips, 878
F.2d at 371. The Federal Government entered into the arrangement with Diners Club (and
other credit card providers) in order to simplify its paperwork and improve its cash flow
situation. Id. at 374. The misuse of such credit cards by Government employees is a
recurring problem; a disadvantageous side effect which accompanies the Government's
approach to eliminating the paperwork and cash flow costs associated with covering the
travel costs of its employees through normal fiscal channels. See, e.g. Maj. Jane M. E.
Peterson, American Express Travel Card Abuse: Can We Control the Problem?, TIG
BRIEF, July-Aug. 1996, at 18; Have Card, Will Charge, GOv'T EXECUTIVE, Oct. 1996, at
6.
68 "Employees shall satisfy in good faith their obligations as citizens, including all just
financial obligations, especially those - such as Federal, State or local taxes - that are
imposed by law." Exec. Order No. 12,674, § 101(1), 54 Fed. Reg. 15,159 (1989), reprinted
as amended in 5 U.S.C.A. § 7301, app. at 170-71 (West 1996). The wording of the
analogous predecessor provision in the now superseded regulaion stated that "[an employee
is expected to meet all just financial obligations, especially those - such as Federal, State
or local taxes - that are imposed by law." Exec. Order No. 11,222, § 205, 30 Fed. Reg.
6469 (1969) (emphasis added). While the polite diplomatic language of the predecessor
provision might arguably have accommodated some ambiguity, the blunt directive language
in Exec. Order No. 12,674 unequivocally and emphatically requires Federal employees to
meet their personal tax obligations.
In the past, the salaries of Federal employees were exempt from state taxation. See, e.g.,
Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie Co., 41 U.S. (6 Pet.) 435 (1842). By 1939, several
exceptions had been carved out. See, e.g., Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
Beginning in 1941, Congress specifically permitted states to tax the salaries of Federal
1998]
17
Ryesky: Of Taxes and Duties
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1998
AKRON LAW REVIEW
returns of Federal employees, effectively imposing upon such returns a closer
degree of scrutiny.69
One court decision has characterized the understatement of taxable income by
an IRS employee (and, presumably, any other Federal employee) as a falsification
of a government record,70 an offense of grave import in any circumstance.7'
Where a Federal employee's position entails the entrustment of sensitive
information in the performance of his or her official duties, intentional attempts to
evade taxes by preparing a fraudulent return casts question upon the good judgment,
ethics and trustworthiness so essential to the employee's position.72 It is immaterial
in these instances whether such sensitive information is actually disclosed by such
an employee.73
In a matter where certain New York City police officers allegedly failed to
properly file their tax returns, the Federal prosector minced few words about the
seriousness of a police officer intentionally disobeying the tax laws.74 Police
employees on the same basis as those of any other persons. See 4 U.S.C. §§ 104-111
(1995).
69 See George Guttman, The Tax Compliance of Federal Government Employees, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Mar. 18, 1996, at 1589, available in LEXIS 96 TNT 55-8.
70 Gipson v. Veterans Admin., 682 F.2d 1004, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The Gipson case,
in citing various examples of falsifying government records, referred, inter alia, to Rotolo
v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 636 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1980), where an IRS employee was
removed for filing a tax return which claimed improper deductions and failed to report
income. Id.
71 Id.; Gomez v. Social Sec. Admin., 70 M.S.P.R. 257, 265 (M.S.P.B. 1996); Scott v.
Department of Justice, 69 M.S.P.R. 211,242-44 (M.S.P.B. 1995), aff'd, 99 F.3d 1160 (Fed.
Cir. 1996); Gillen v. Smithtown Library Bd. of Trustees, 10/16/97 N.Y.L.J. 33, (cols. 3-4)
(Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co.).
72 Brandt v. Department ofthe Navy, 22 M.S.P.R. 36, 39-40 (M.S.P.B. 1984), aff'd, 856
F.2d 202 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (upholding the revocation of an employee's top security clearance
for having been convicted on felony tax evasion charges).
73 id.
74 Don Van Natta, Jr., 600 City Employees Suspected in a Plot for Evading Taxes, NEW
YORK TIMES, July 18, 1996, at B-5 (quoting U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White):
That these defendants are police officers sworn to uphold the law makes the crimes
charged all the more galling and offensive.... Those in law enforcement have a
heightened duty to obey all the laws and to set an example for others, not to
brazenly declare that they are somehow above the law.
Id. The matter involved fifteen current or former New York City police officers arrested on
Federal charges of failure to file income tax returns. Id. Mayor Rudolph Giuliani (himself
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officers clearly have some sort of enhanced duty to file their personal tax returns,
though there remains some limited room for argument as to the degree of this
enhanced duty. 75 Firefighters likewise can be held to the fulfillment of their
personal tax obligations as a condition of their continued employment.76
At least one state has been upheld in its removal of a professional educator for
a tax fraud conviction, recognizing the nexus of such an offense to the position's
requirement of moral turpitude as a model to young school students.77
Elected officials, who ostensibly serve as role models for their constituents, can
also be said to have an enhanced duty to file their tax returns and otherwise comply
with the tax laws.78 In the words of one Federal prosecutor, "[i]t's particularly
troubling to see people who were once given significant public trust who have
violated tax laws that we're all supposed to follow. ' 79 Indeed, being a taxpayer has,
a former United States Attorney) said investigation was continuing on as many as 600
additional City employees. Id.; cf Robert E. Kessler, 15 Cops Arrested in Tax Case,
NEWSDAY, July 18, 1996, at A 6 (report of same news event attributes a similar but not
verbatim quotation to U.S. Attorney White).
The fifteen current or former police officers allegedly asserted "tax protester" arguments
in the tax return documents, and in their statements before the Federal Magistrate. For
discussion of tax protesters, see infra notes 117-126 and accompanying text.
71 See Crawford v. Department of the Treasury, 56 M.S.P.R. 224, 227 (M.S.P.B. 1993);
Mitchell v. United States Postal Serv., 32 M.S.P.R. 362, 365-66. (1987). For a discussion
of the Crawford and Mitchell decisions, see supra note 66.
76 See, e.g., Pisano v. McKenna, 466 N.Y.S. 2d 231 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (dismissing
firefighter for sales tax violations in connection with his personal business venture).
77 Logan v. Warren County Bd. of Educ., 549 F. Supp. 145 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (upholding
removal of school principal after conviction on charges of submitting false documents to the
IRS).
78 See, e.g., In re Gribetz, 646 N.Y.S. 2d 279 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (disbarring a
county District Attorney because he had willfully failed to disclose certain income on his
Federal tax returns).
Elected officials are also held to a higher standard by the courts in the conduct of their
personal tax affairs. See, e.g., Blanton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1100, 1106
(1997) (taxpayer who was Governor of Tennessee and a former U.S. Congressman was held
to higher standard regarding imposition of civil tax fraud penalty).
'9 Liam Pleven, Tax Indictment: Two Ex-officials in Brookhaven Accused of Evasion,
NEWSDAY, Sept. 28, 1994, at A 5 (quoting Assistant U.S. Attorney Alan Vinegrad's
comment on indictment of two former Brookhaven town elected officials). Mr. Vinegrad
(or any other Assistant U.S. Attorney) would be hard pressed to empathize with tax evaders
in light of the specific personal tax compliance requirements imposed upon Federal
prosecutors, see 28 C.F.R. § 45.735-15 (1996), which requires all employees of the
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in the past, been a requirement for the holding of certain elective offices.80 Also,
the willful failure to properly report income on a tax return has been cause for
removal of a judge from the bench. 1
III. PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION ISSUES
Several personnel administration issues are relevant as governmental agencies
attempt to enforce their employees' fulfillment of their ever-complicative and
ambiguous tax law obligations. The public agency which attempts such
enforcement may well be confronted with one or more of the following issues
discussed in this section.
A. Confidentiality of Tax Returns
Specific information about an individual's tax returns now enjoys a special
privilege of confidentiality.82 The American system of voluntary tax compliance 3
Department of Justice, including Assistant U.S. Attorneys, to fulfill theirpersonal, State, and
Federal tax obligations, and which is a reiteration and amplification of the tax compliance
requirements imposed generally upon all Federal employees in the Executive Branch. See
supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
80 Darrow v. People, 8 P. 661, 663-64 (Colo. 1885), reh'g denied, 8 P. 924 (Colo. 1885);
Jones v. Darby, 161 S.E. 835, 837 (Ga. 1932); State v. McDonald, 145 So. 508 (Miss.
1933); Sathre v. Quickstad, 268 N.W. 683 (N.D. 1936). The Jones and McDonald cases
involved a requirement that the elected official qualify as an elector, coupled with the
requirement that an eligible elector be a taxpayer. Accordingly, the rulings in Jones and
McDonald have lost much, if not all, precedential value in the wake of subsequent legal
developments such as the 24th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and Supreme Court
decisions in cases such as Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)
(invalidating the poll tax as a requirement for voting in state and local elections), and
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (issue of whether owning
or leasing taxable real property is a valid requirement for voting in an election).
Darrow and Sathre, on the other hand, involved requirements that holders of certain
offices be payers of property taxes, and did not deal with requirements for voting in such
elections. In any event, there is an obvious and significant difference between a requirement
to own or lease real property as a condition to holding elective office on one hand, and a
requirement to attend to the filing of all tax returns which may be obligatory on the other.
81 E.g., Steinberg v. State Comm. on Judicial Conduct, 409 N.E.2d 1378 (N.Y. 1980).
82 I.R.C. § 6103 (West 1998). Prior to 1977, individual income tax returns were treated
as public records whose disclosure was limited to certain specific situations, the
interpretation of which was subject to great latitude of administrative discretion. The Tax
Reform Act of 1976, P.L. 94-455, § 1202, instituted a new approach, specifying that tax
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is vitally dependent upon the confidential safekeeping of taxpayer and tax return
information by the taxation authorities.84 The Internal Revenue Code specifically
regulates the disclosure of information in IRS files,85 and provides sanctions against
those who make improper disclosure.86 Law in the various states likewise provides
for confidentiality of tax returns.81
returns, and the information contained in them, was confidential information which was
subject to strict safeguards in its disclosure, including a provision that the IRS could not
disclose tax return information to any state or Federal government agency which had not
specifically adopted certain safeguards to keep the information confidential. The new
approach effectively removed much of the varying administrative interpretations regarding
tax return confidentiality which had theretofore prevailed.
Historically, the first effective Federal income tax, instituted to help finance the Civil
War, had no specific confidentiality provisions and in fact provided that "lists, valuations
and enumerations... may be examined; and said lists shall remain open for examination for
the space of fifteen days after notice shall have been given..." Act of July 1, 1862, 12 Stat.
432, 437. From that time until the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the confidentiality of tax
returns waxed and waned according to various prevailing political and administrative forces
and sentiments. For a detailed account of the tax return confidentiality practices and theories
in force prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, see S. Doc. No. 94-266, chapt. 6 at 821-1135
(1975).
83 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
8 See, e.g., Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Pa. Human Relations Comm., 463 F. Supp. 120,
122-23 (E.D. Pa. 1979); State Dep't. of Taxation & Finance v. State Dep't. of Law, 378
N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1978); James H. Tully, Jr., State Tax Secrecy Laws and Federal Grand
Jury Subpoenas in Non-Tax Investigations, 46 ALBANY L. REV. 78-83 (1981); see also
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, ESTATE AND GIFr TAX LAW FOR ATTORNEYS, STUDENT TEXT
UNIT I at 32-3 (IRS Training Material 3129-22, TPDS 85576 (January 1986)) ("Effective
tax administration and the maintenance of taxpayer compliance and public confidence in the
tax system will depend in large measure on how effectively you handle this trust [of
confidentiality].").
85 I.R.C. § 6103 (West 1998).
86 I.R.C. § 7213 provides that unauthorized disclosure of taxpayer-specific data is
criminal offense. I.R.C. § 7213 (West 1998); see also U.S. v. Richey, 924 F.2d 857 (9th
Cir. 1991).
I.R.C. § 7216 criminalizes as a misdemeanor the improper disclosure of tax return
information by private tax return preparers. I.R.C. § 7216 (West 1998).
87 E.g., GA. CODEANN. § 48-2-15 (1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:1508 (West 1990);
N.Y. TAX LAW § 202 (McKinney 1996); PHOENIX, ARIZ. TAX CODE § 14-510
(<http://www.ci.phoenix.az.us/plt/artv.html#bm14510) (visited Oct. 10, 1997); see also
King v. Mobile Home Rent Review Bd., 265 Cal. Rptr. 624 (1989); Finance Comm'n v.
Commissioner of Revenue, 417 N.E.2d 945 (Mass. 1981); Bruce D. Goldstein,
Confidentiality and Dissemination of Personal Information: An Examination of State Laws
Governing Data Protection, 41 EMORY L. J. 1185 (1992).
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In view of the privileged nature of individuals' tax affairs, the disclosure of tax
returns is most strongly disfavored by the courts, and will only be compelled where
the information to be gained therefrom is indispensable to the resolution of the case
and such information is not reasonably available from other sources."8 Even where
tax returns are discoverable, the courts have permitted them to be sanitized of
employer identification numbers and other personal data not germane to the issues
being litigated. 9
Any interest of the government, as an employer, in its employees' personal tax
returns must be cogent enough to outweigh the confidentiality accorded generally
to personal tax returns. The accession by a government agency of an employee's
tax return is a sensitive matter under any circumstances, and will invariably raise
questions of propriety if done in any manner or time other than those clearly
defined in procedure and/or clearly warranted for compelling security reasons. 90
B. Detecting the Nonfiler Employees
The IRS makes an annual check of its computer records to verify that its
employees have filed returns. 9' The data from such a check may be misleading,
however. The "classic example" is a female IRS employee who, having been
employed by the IRS for a number of years and having duly filed her tax returns,
88 E.g., DeMasi v. Weiss, 669 F2d 114, 119-20 (3d Cir. 1982); Ex Parte Morris, 530
So.2d 785 (Ala. 1988); Active Fire Sprinkler Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 609
N.Y.S. 2d 663, (App. Div. 1994); Briton v. Knott Hotels Corp., 489 N.Y.S. 2d 186 (App.
Div. 1986); Sprague v. Walter, 656 A.2d 890,914-15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), app. denied 673
A.2d 336 (Pa. 1996); Estate of Borman, 8/12/96 N.Y.L.J. 33, (col. 2) (Surr. Ct. Nassau Co.);
Estate of Cramer, 10/18/95 N.Y.L.J. 32, (col. 5) (Surr. Ct. Westchester Co.); In re Kraus,
8/15/94 N.Y.L.J. 33, (col. 5) (Surr. Ct. Westchester Co.).
The sealing of estate tax returns required to be filed with the Surrogate's Courts in New
York is an issue which, pending adoption of a statewide policy, was resolved by one
Surrogate by ordering the returns in question to be sealed except to those having a legal need
to access the information. Estate of Wildstein, 1/15/97 N.Y.L.J. 28, col. 1 (Surr. Ct. Bronx
Co.).
89 See, e.g., Estate of Charnoff, 5/15/96 N.Y.L.J. 29.; cf. Rosenfeld v. Kaplan, 666
N.Y.S.2d 180, (App. Div. 1997) (ordering the defendant's discovery of the plaintiff's
redacted tax returns.).
90 See, e.g., IRS Inquiry Preceded Firing, NEWSDAY, July 4, 1996, at A17 (request by
White House for an IRS records check of White House usher Christopher B. Emery aroused
questions of propriety).
91 See Guttman, supra note 43, at 598; David Cay Johnston, Tax Compliance Isn't
Perfect Among Workers at I.R.S., NEW YORK TIMES, May 1, 1995, at D1.
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gets married and files a joint return under her husband's Social Security number
which is not detected by the IRS computer record check.92 Moreover, the IRS
computer system has been known to make errors,93 and mishandling of taxpayer
returns is not unknown.94 It is not difficult to imagine imperfections in the IRS's
annual computer check of its employees, including instances where the employee
in question makes a geographic move.
IRS employees are, of course, subject to examinations of their prior tax returns
as conditions of their employment.95 A new IRS hire who, being fresh out of
college, had never earned sufficient income to necessitate filing an Income Tax
Return might conceivably be misidentified as the subject for disciplinary action.
Where the employee is employed by an agency other than the IRS, the tax filing
data is no longer firsthand information and thus, there obviously would be all the
more potential for misidentification of the employee as the subject of disciplinary
action for nonfiling.
C. Proper Reporting of Income and Complexity of the Tax Law
Even where the tax return is timely filed, there remains the question of whether
92 Johnston, supra note 92, at D1.
Married taxpayers may file a joint income tax return. I.R.C. § 6013 (West 1998). For
a discussion of other problems involving joint returns, see infra notes 111-16 and
accompanying text.
93 See, e.g., Husby v. United States, 672 F.Supp. 442 (N.D. Calif. 1987); Ryan J.
Donmoyer, IRS Computers Behind Many Return Rejections, TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 3,
1995, at 16, available in LEXIS 95 TNT 61-2.
94 See, e.g., Richard E. Harris, IRS Memos Confirm Mishandling of Tax Returns, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Nov. 12, 1985, at 559; Kenneth H. Ryesky, Analysis of the Split Authority
on Proof of a Postmark under Internal Revenue Code § 7502, 21 U. OF DAYTON L. REV.
379, 391 n.n. 70-71 (1996).
9' At the time the author was employed by the IRS, that agency had a Form 5012
(11/80), "New Employee Tax Verification," upon which an IRS job applicant certified
whether Federal income tax returns were timely filed and taxes timely paid during the prior
three years. The information thus supplied by the applicant was then verified by the IRS.
(Copy of author's Form 5012 on file with author). During the author's interview for
employment with the IRS (10/19/87), he was given a sheet of paper entitled "Information
to be Given to Applicants during Interview," which highlighted as a "negative" about the
job the fact that prospective hiree's past tax returns would be audited (copy on file with
author).
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the correct tax is properly computed. Federal and state taxation 96 are extremely
complex, specialized and esoteric areas of the law where material provisions are
sometimes not codified in the Internal Revenue Code, 97 and even the codified
exceptions to the rules have their own exceptions.98 The Treasury Regulations
which elucidate, explain and implement the Internal Revenue Code can likewise be
confusing. 99 Tax law complexity has stymied even the most learned of judges. 1°°
96 State taxation statutes generally follow the scheme of the Internal Revenue Code in
computing the parameters such as gross income and allowable deductions. See, e.g., N.Y.
TAX LAW § 612 (McKinney 1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 62, §§ 2-3 (West 1998); see
also In re Cohn, 96 B.R. 827 (N.D. 111. 1988); Zenith Indus. Corp. v. Department of the
Treasury, 394 N.W.2d 451, 453 (Mich. App. 1986) ("The Michigan legislature
'piggybacked' the state corporate income tax scheme on the Internal Revenue Code.");
GENERAL ACCT. OFF., REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE: TAX
ADMINISTRATION: FEDSTATE EFFORTS OFFER OPPORTUNITIES BUT PROGRAM NEEDS
IMPROVEMENT, REPORT No. GAO/GGD-97-16, Oct. 31, 1996, available in LEXIS 96 TNT
214-7.
Moreover, many state statutes explicitly defer to Federal redeterminations of such
parameters. E.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 659 (McKinney 1988); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120,
§ 5-506(b); Kenneth H. Ryesky, When Must New York Abide by a Federal Estate Tax
Audit?, N.Y. ST. BAR J., July/August 1994, at 32.
97 See, e.g., In re Hickok, 552 N.Y.S. 2d 49 (App. Div. 1990), leave to appeal denied,
565 N.E.2d 516 (N.Y. 1990), which deals with an uncodified tax statute, § 403(3) of Pub.
L. 97-34, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 ("ERTA"). ERTA revised I.R.C. § 2056
to provide for an unlimited marital deduction with respect to Estate and Gift taxes. Id. Prior
to 1982, the marital deduction was limited to the greater of $250,000 or one-half the
adjusted gross estate by the old I.R.C. § 2056. Accordingly, the phrase "maximum marital
deduction allowable" or similar terminology had a different meaning in 1980 than in 1990.
ERTA § 403(3) provided a transitional rule for certain wills or trusts applying a marital
deduction formula which were executed prior to September 12, 1981. The transitional rule
was never codified into the Internal Revenue Code. The issue of pre-ERTA wills remains
a complex one. Compare Hickok, 552 N.Y.S. 2d 49, with In re Murphy, 10/20/92 N.Y.L.J.
26. (Pre-ERTA will clause "... .maximum amount allowable as the marital deduction ..."
construed by the Court as full marital deduction.); see also Gregory V. DiCenso, Handling
the Unlimited Marital Deduction in Pre-ERTA Instruments, PRACTICAL TAX LAWYER, Fall
1993, at 63.
98 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2035, "Adjustments for certain gifts made within 3 years of
decedent's death." I.R.C. § 2035 (West 1998). The general rule in § 2035(a) includes such
transfers in a decedent's estate. §§ 2035(b) and 2035(d) are statutory exceptions to the
general rule set forth in § 2035(a). §§ 2035(d)(2) and 2035(d)(3), however, set forth
exceptions to the exceptions provided in §§ 2035(b) and 2035(d).
99 See, e.g., United States v. Neal, 93 F.3d 219, 223 (6th Cir. 1996).
[Treasury Regulation] Section 31.6011 (a) is potentially confusing because it reads
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So confusing are the tax laws that high-ranking IRS employees have admitted
engaging professionals to prepare their tax returns, for fear of making errors.'0 '
circularly: an employer is required to make a return if it is required to make a
return. Nonetheless, it is clear upon a close reading of the regulation that the word
'return' is used interchangeably to mean both (1) a remittance of taxes withheld
from employees, and (2) a specific form or statement documenting information
required by the Secretary. Applying these meanings to § 31.6011 (a), an employer
who has to 'make a return' (send a remittance) of taxes withheld shall 'make a
return' (file a statement) on Form 941.
Id.
'0o See, e.g., Judge Learned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALEL. J. 167, 169 (1947):
[T]he words of the such an act as the Income Tax, for example, merely dance
before my eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-reference to cross-reference,
exception upon exception - couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize
hold of - leave in my mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but
successfully concealed purport, which it is my duty to extract, but which is within
my power, if at all, only after the most inordinate expenditure of time.
Id.; see also Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199-200, (1991) ("The proliferation of
statutes and regulations has sometimes made it difficult for the average citizen to know and
comprehend the extent of the duties and obligations imposed by the tax laws."); Friedman
v. Commissioner, 53 F.3d 523, 525 (2d Cir. 1995) (In the "bewildering world of tax shelter
deductions, few experts, let alone laypersons, easily discern the difference between a
fraudulent scheme and an exceptionally advantageous legal loophole in the tax code.");
Houston Textile Co. v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 464, 464 (5th Cir. 1949) ("This petition
brings up for solution one of those difficult jigsaw tax law puzzles all too common in the
present deplorable crazy quilt patchwork state of the Internal Revenue laws."); In re Air
Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 20, 1988, 37 F.3d 804, 818 (2d Cir., 1994), cert.
denied, Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Pagnucco, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995) ("We see
no reason that would prompt us to view heavily regulated air carriers ... the same as
individual taxpayers who face the daunting task of unraveling the complexities of the
Internal Revenue Code."); United States v. McCullough, 94-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 50,280 (S.
D. Ill. 1994) at 84, 127 (Judge Gilbert described Internal Revenue Code as "confusing and
at times contradictory...").
In view of the judiciary's oft-conceded difficulty with the Internal Revenue Code, it is
hardly surprising that some sections of the Code are given diverse interpretations and
constructions among the various courts. See generally Ryesky, supra note 94.
101 Joy Vestal, Newsmaker: Carol Landy, NEWSDAY, Apr. 11, 1995, at A22 (quoting
Carol Landy, Director of the Internal Revenue Service Center, Brookhaven (Holtsville), NY:
"I don't do my own tax return. I'm afraid to make a mistake."); Christopher Cox, Good
Question, FORBEs, Jan. 1, 1996, at 30, reproduced in InfoTrac microfilm reel No. Bus.
84-E-2073 (Information Access Co.) (Then Internal Revenue Commissioner Fred Goldberg
reportedly admitted to Rep. Christopher Cox (R. Calif.) to engaging an accountant to prepare
his personal income tax returns.); Tom Herman, Tax Report; A Special Summary and
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While government agencies can and do require their employees to timely and
correctly file and pay their taxes, to what extent can or should a government agency
make a determination as to whether an employee's tax return was properly
completed in light of the tax laws high degree of specialization? Put another way,
what business has a taxpayer's employer in insinuating itself amidst a conflict
between the taxpayer and the IRS (or state taxation authority)?
Where the employer is the IRS or a state taxation authority, there is not much
room to question the employer's qualifications for determining whether a tax return
was properly completed. For non-taxation agencies, however, the issue can be
significant.
That a government agency other than a taxation authority ought not make a
determination of whether a tax return was properly completed is illustrated by Shea
v. Civil Service Commission.0 2 Shea involved a revenue collections supervisor for
the Illinois Department of Revenue who had run into difficulty due to certain
defalcations by his ex-wife, of which Shea apparently had neither knowledge nor
involvement. 0 3 In dismissing Mr. Shea from his employment, the Illinois Civil
Service Commission made a determination that Shea had, inter alia, failed to
comply with the state tax laws. 1° 4 The court agreed with Mr. Shea that the Illinois
Civil Service Commission did not have the authority to make a determination of a
tax deficiency, which it impliedly did in determining that Mr. Shea had failed to
comply with the tax laws. 5
A non-taxation government agency is thus caught in a bind: While there is
good reason for the agency to require, under compulsion of discipline, that its
employees comply with the tax laws, such an agency can be fettered in the prompt
administration of its disciplinary prerogative by having to defer to a decision
process (which might include an appellate process) of a separate agency.
Forecast of Federal and State Tax Developments, WALL ST. J. Apr. 15, 1998, at Al (new
IRS Commissioner Charles Rossotti admitting that he has not prepared his own tax returns
since the 1970's, and indicating that time pressures will likely compel him to continue to
engage a professional tax preparer now that he has joined the IRS as Commissioner.). It is
certainly not imprudent for an IRS employee to engage professional help in preparing a
personal income tax return, given the fact that an error on such a return can trigger
disciplinary action against the IRS employee. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
102 586 N.E.2d 512 (I. App. Ct. 1991), app. denied, 591 N.E.2d 31 (111. 1992).
103 Id. at 513-14.
'4 Id. at 514. There were other unrelated matters involved in disciplining Mr. Shea,
including the failure to obtain approval for outside employment.
10s Id.
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Another problem involving the complexity of the tax law is that certain
technicalities in the tax law give rise to events where the taxpayer, with no ill intent,
is not in a position to pay the tax due. Examples of this type of problem include
debt forgiveness and involuntary mortgage foreclosures.1 16 Whether and what type
of discipline should be imposed upon a Federal employee in such a position can
pose some difficult questions.
0 7
D. Spouse's Income
Married taxpayers may, and often do, elect to filejoint returns for their personal
income taxes.' Currently, spouses who so file are jointly and severally liable for
the total amount of the tax due," 9 though there are some rather stringent provisions
for the so-called "innocent spouse" relief."0 Absent a viable "innocent spouse"
defense, however, each spouse is liable for any additions or changes to the tax
return in question which might be made by the IRS subsequent to the filing,
106 A gain over the basis of property involved in an involuntary mortgage foreclosure
constitutes income notwithstanding the fact that the mortgagor might actually receive no
proceeds from the event. See, e.g., Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504 (1941).
107 See Monterosso v. Department of the Treasury, 6 M.S.P.R. 684 (M.S.P.B. 1981).
Monterosso involved a GS-3 IRS mail clerk who, upon audit of his return, incurred an
involuntary constructive capital gain on a mortgage foreclosure. Id. at 690. The clerk found
himself in a position of owing an income tax attributable to the transaction, but having no
money with which to pay it.
10' I.R.C. § 6013 (West 1998).
109 I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (West 1998).
1"0 I.R.C. § 6013(e) (West 1998); see also John J. Tigue, Jr. & Linda A. Lacewell, The
'Innocent Spouse' defense -- Ignorance Is Not Bliss, 11/16/95 N.Y.L.J. 3. One may qualify
for "innocent spouse" relief with respect to a portion of the tax in question, but be ineligible
for such relief with respect to the remainder of the tax. See, e.g. Morris v. Commissioner,
72 T.C.M. (CCH) 1042 (1996); Barrett v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 458, 471-72
(1989).
By the time the matter comes to the courts, the one claiming to be an innocent spouse
is often an ex-spouse. See, e.g., Crowley v. C.I.R., 70 TCM (CCH) 1374 (1995), aff'd by,
Cockrell v. C.I.R., 116 F.3d 1472 (2d. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1163 (1998);
Berman v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1798 (1993), affd, 47 F.3d 1158 (2d Cir.
1995); Barrett, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 458; Hill v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 163 (1990).
In response to the excesses which the IRS had been known to resort to in cases such as
Cockrell, Congress amended I.R.C. § 6013 to give greater relief to spouses in tax collection
situations through the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act, Pub. L. 105-
206, Act § 3201, 112 Stat. 734-40 (1998). Despite the liberalization of § 6013,joint liability
for taxes reported on joint income tax returns remains an issue.
1998] 375
27
Ryesky: Of Taxes and Duties
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1998
regardless of which spouse's acts or omissions gave rise to the adjustment.l"' One
can encounter significant problems in connection with one's spouse's errors and
omissions in dealing with the government.'
1 2
The filing of a joint return has in fact given rise to the discipline of public
employees due to tax return errors or omissions attributable to the spouses of such
employees. 113 It is not clear that a uniform standard is used determining whether
discipline is to be meted out to public employees whose spouses stray from their tax
reporting duties, however, Federal employees who have interposed in their
disciplinary proceedings a defense analogous to the "innocent spouse" defense have
"' See, e.g., Dolan v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 420 (1965). Congress, concerned with
certain unfair aspects of the joint and several liability provisions, directed the Secretary of
the Treasury and the Comptroller General (General Accounting Office) to conduct separate
studies on the matter. Pub. L. 104-168 § 401, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996). The General
Accounting Office submitted the Comptroller General's report on Mar. 12, 1997, more than
a month past the Jan. 30, 1997 deadline set forth by Congress in the statute. GEN. ACCT.
OFF., REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE OF WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND
THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, U.S. SENATE: TAX POLICY: INFORMATION ON THE JOINT AND
SEVERAL LIABILITY STANDARD, REPORT No. GAO/GGD-97-34, Mar. 12, 1997 available
in LEXIS 97 TNT 49-20).
For its part, the Treasury Department was even more remiss in meeting the Jan. 30, 1997
deadline for conducting and reporting its study to Congress. The Treasury report was not
submitted until Feb. 9, 1998, more than a year past the deadline. U.S. TREAS., REPORT ON
JOINT LIABILITY AND INNOCENT SPOUSE ISSUES (Feb. 9, 1998). It is clear from the
Treasury's Report that the document was a cooperative venture between the Treasury
Department itself and the IRS, with the IRS pulling the laboring oar. The Treasury's (read
"IRS' s") delinquency in that regard can only stoke public cynicism towards the IRS and ill
serves to maintain the voluntary compliance so important to the American system. Cf. supra
notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
112 Being married to a wrongdoer can entangle a person into significant legal troubles,
tax-related or otherwise. See, e.g., David Johnston, C.I.A. Officer Takes Dealfor Life Term
in Spy Case, NEW YORK TIMES, Apr. 27, 1994, at A12 (discussing criminal charges against
spouses of Aldrich Ames and Jonathan Pollard, two Federal employees who were involved
in espionage incidents: both respective spouses had gotten entangled in their husbands'
illegal acts, and would in fact serve time in prison); James Brooke, Congresswoman Faces
Increasing Skepticism, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 22, 1996, at A 10 (discussing the damage to
political career of Utah Congresswoman Enid Greene Waldholtz on account of her
husband's defalcations).
"' See, e.g., Micali v. Department of the Treasury, 56 M.S.P.R. 127 (M.S.P.B. 1992);
Monaco v. Department of the Treasury, I.R.S., 15 M.S.P.R. 727 (M.S.P.B. 1983);
Department of Revenue v. Smith, 501 N.E.2d 1370 (111. App. Ct. 1986).
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found relief in the degree of discipline imposed." 14
The issue of where to draw a line between one's personal domestic situation
and one's public employment has no clear cut solutions, and no immediate
prospects of abating. It will likely remain a problem with respect to a public
employee's tax obligations as long as there is any form of joint spousal tax liability
and so long as government agencies continue to employ married individuals.
E. Tax Protesters
'Tax protesters' have convinced themselves that wages are not income, that
only gold is money, that the Sixteenth Amendment is unconstitutional, and so on.
These beliefs all lead - so tax protesters think - to the elimination of their
obligation to pay taxes. The government may not prohibit the holding of these
beliefs, but it may penalize people who act on them.'
1 5
Participants in the so-called "tax protest movement" have gone to any and all
extremes to impede the orderly administration of the American taxation system.
Quite commonplace is the repeated litigation by non-filers of tax deficiencies in the
Tax Court,' 6 and the imposition of frivolous arguments and rationale for defeating
taxes.1' 7 Tax protesters have been known to take even more extreme and vexatious
14 See Boyce v. United States, 543 F.2d 1290 (Ct.Cl. 1976).
115 Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 69 (7th Cir. 1986).
116 See, e.g., Burnett v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 811, 813 (1994) ("Petitioner
testified that he has not filed a tax return since 1980, and plans to litigate each and every
notice of deficiency he receives with the same arguments."); Webb v. Commissioner, 66
T.C.M. (CCH) 1273 (1993), afftd, 46 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 1995).
17 E.g., Partos v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 560 (1991) (tax protester contended
that payment of the Federal income tax was voluntary); Buske v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1627 n.2 (1998) (taxpayer also contended that the Internal Revenue Code does not
apply outside of the District of Columbia); Verbeck v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 204
n.2 (1996), aftd, 108 F.3d 1387 (9t' Cir. 1997) (tax protester argued that he was an
American citizen but not a United States citizen, and therefore, the U.S. Government had
no right to tax him); Fox v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1831, 1833 (1993), affd, 69
F.3d 543 (9" Cir. 1995) (tax protestor argued that he is a sovereign individual nonresident
alien and therefore not liable for the taxes); United States v. Ware, 608 F.2d 400 (10th Cir.
1979) (tax protestor argued that his income was in Federal Reserve Notes and not dollars,
that Federal Reserve Notes are mere promises to pay, and that any income must be paid in
specie and not promises); Lowman v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.M. (RIA) 97,574 (1997)
(petitioner contended that the tax law was unenforceable because the symbol "$" used to
specify the taxes was undefined and ambiguous); Nulsen v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M.
(CCH) 915 (1991) (tax protester asserted argument that he was not liable for the tax because
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actions. 118
In the case of the common citizen, it is not always clear when one crosses the
oft-blurred line between availing oneself of one's Constitutional rights and illegally
evading one's taxes. One may dislike paying one's taxes, and may even write notes
and letters expressing disparagement for the IRS.1 9 Even the public expression that
citizens should assert their rights against IRS is permissible. 120 Nevertheless, a
citizen or resident is required to file the prescribed tax returns with the Federal and
State taxation authorities. Such tax returns must inform the IRS (or other taxation
authority) of the taxpayer's tax liability as computed in good faith according to the
tax laws and regulations, and a document which, without good cause, has a primary
purpose of informing the taxation authority of the filer's intention to not pay the
tax, even if styled as a "tax return" and even if prepared on actual tax return forms,
is not a "tax return" for the purposes of the tax return filing requirement.1
2
'
the Form 1040 Instructions booklet did not have an Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) number); Eilertson v. Department of the Navy, 23 M.S.P.R. 152, 157 (M.S.P.B.
1984), aff'd, 770 F.2d 179 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (tax protestor, a civilian employee of the Navy,
who had argued that any legislation imposing taxes on income is "repugnant to the
Constitution" and constitutes an unlawful act of Congress, was removed for filing W-4
forms claiming false exemption from withholding); Avery-Carter v. Commissioner, 66 TCM
(CCH) 1596 (1993) (Petitioner contended that African-Americans had no duty to file tax
returns); Hill v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 13 (1995) (Petitioner argued that Native
Americans had no duty to file tax returns).
118 See, e.g., United States v. Ekblad, 732 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1984) (tax protester had
filed liens against the property personally owned by certain IRS employees); United States
v. Thomas, 819 F. Supp. 927 (D. Colo. 1993); United States v. Hart, 545 F.Supp. 470 (D.
N.D. 1982), aff'd & sanctions imposed for frivolity, 701 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1983) (tax
protester enjoined from performing his threatened posse comitatus arrests of individual IRS
agents); United States v. Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1993) cert. denied sub nom.,.
Brown v. United States 510 U.S. 882 (1993) (Tax protesters submitted false Forms 1099 to
IRS showing false taxable income supposedly earned by certain IRS agents and judges,
causing such IRS agents and judges to suffer consequent entanglement with IRS concerning
their personal tax affairs); see also S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 277-78 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 1023-25; U.S. DEPT. OFJUSTICE, TAxDIV., CRIMINAL
SECTION, CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL (1994), § 40; MARCUS FARBENBLUM, THE IRS AND THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY ACTS OF 1974 43-56 (1991).
"9 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
'20 Fleischner v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 413, 416 n.3 (1995) (finding that a
letter published in the San Diego Evening Tribune suggesting that taxpayers assert Fourth
and Fifth Amendment rights against the IRS was not a badge of fraud).
121 See In re Greatwood, 194 B.R. 637,640 (B.A.P. 9hCir. 1996) aff'd 120 F.3d 268 (9"'
Cir. 1997); see also U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, TAX DIV., CRIMINAL SECTION, CRIMINAL TAx
[Vol. 31:3,4
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Moreover, there is a difference between illegal tax evasion and legitimate tax
avoidance. 22  There is no patriotic duty to increase ones taxes. 123 There is,
however, clear imperative for disciplinary action when a government employee
crosses the fence and enters into the tax protester camp, particularly when such a
government employee espouses the position that the government itself is not a
legitimate sovereign government. Differentiating between good faith creative tax
planning or free expression on one hand, and illegal tax evasion activity on the
other, is a potential problem in enforcing a government employee's duty to
accurately file a tax return. The stakes are high, for toleration by a government of
tax protesters among its work force can only have deleterious effects upon
employee discipline and morale, and upon public respect for the government.24
Striking the sensitive balance between a public employee's rights and his or her tax
obligations is a necessary process, yet it carries high potential for conflict and
confusion.
F. Employee Workplace Rights
Though they have certain special responsibilities, Government employees do
have personal and workplace rights which the government must honor. The
personal tax obligations of government employees can give rise to issues of such
rights.
All of the ethical and aspirational considerations which dictate that public
employees comply with the tax laws would be rendered laughable and meaningless
if, while the nonfiler government employee remains on the public payroll, the very
government which employs the nonfiler is unable to collect the tax money it is
owed. That being so, there remains an essential public interest in the rights of
public employees which the government must protect. Those two considerations
do have the potential for conflict.
Such a conflict arose in Levitt v. Board of Collective Barganing 25 In Levitt,
the New York State Court of Appeals ruled that the unilateral dictation by the City
MANUAL (1994), § 40.02[2].
122 Friedman v. Commissioner, 53 F.3d 523, 525 (2d Cir. 1995) (commenting on the
difference between a fraudulent scheme and a loophole in the tax code).
123 Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), affid, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
124Eilertson v. Departmentof the Navy, 23 M.S.P.R. 152, 157 (M.S.P.B. 1984); see also
Van Natta, supra note 74; Kessler, supra note 74 (apparent participation among New York
City police officers in a tax protest scheme); Brief for Respondent, Kooi, 517 N.Y.S. 2d 601
(No. 53842), supra notes 37, 55-58 and accompanying text.
'2' 589 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1992).
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of New York that its employees agree to repay their public debts in order for
continued employment was an unfair labor practice.
126
Though Levitt appears to hobble the New York City government in its
collection of revenues owed by its own employees, it would appear that managerial
solutions to the problem are available to the City. For one thing, there is little doubt
that an employee who falsely represents in writing that he or she has no such tax
debts would be subject to discipline, including removal, for making false
statements. 127 Moreover, if the employee in question failed tofile the tax returns,
that too might serve as a basis for discipline.
12
As discussed earlier, another issue is the employee's right of confidentiality
with respect to his or her personal tax affairs. 129 For the employee in a non-taxation
governmental agency, the confidentiality issue has its implications as to what tax
return information one's employer has a right to know; and even in a taxation
agency such as the IRS there are implications as to what business one's lineal
supervisor has in knowing the details of one's personal tax return. In that regard,
it must be noted that there is a difference between disclosing taxpayer return
information1 30 on one hand, and disclosing the fact that a return was or was not filed
on the other. If only the fact of filing is disclosed, with no disclosure of any
taxpayer return information, then the dynamics of public embarrassment would
selectively affect only those who did not comply with the law, and who could avoid
such embarrassment by timely filing the required tax returns. Accordingly, public
126 Id. at 922-23. However, a questionnaire requiring disclosure of such debts and
disclosure of whether city income tax returns were filed was not an unfair labor practice.
Id. Because the New York City Resident Income Tax is computed, filed, administered and
collected in conjunction with the New York State Income Tax returns, a New York City
resident who files a New York City income tax return would normally file a New York State
return in the process. Id.
127 See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 434 F.2d 1346 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Moran v. Baxter,
597 N.Y.S. 2d 688 (App. Div. 1993).
128 See Kooi v. Chu, 517 N.Y.S. 2d 601 (App. Div. 1987) (discussed supra note 55 and
accompanying text.) Though the Kooi case involved removal of employees involved in the
taxation function, the same arguments advanced by the government in Kooi could be used
to substantiate some form of discipline, even if, arguendo, it is a sanction short of removal.
129 For discussion of confidentiality of tax returns, see supra notes 83-91 and
accompanying text.
130 For purposes of Federal tax return confidentiality, I.R.C. § 6103(b)(3) explicitly
defines "taxpayer return information" in terms of "return information" as defined in I.R.C.
§ 6103(b)(2), which in turn is defined in terms of "return" as defined in I.R.C. § 6103(b)(1).
See I.R.C. § 6103(b)(1)-(3) (West 1998).
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disclosure of the fact of filing (or lack thereof) actually serves to encourage the
governmental objective of voluntary compliance with the tax laws.'
Yet another workplace rights issue involves potential abuses in selectively
enforcing the employees' tax obligations. The complexity of the tax law is such
that any government employee whose income picture (or that of such employee's
spouse) involves more than simple wages and interest will run the risk of
calculating a tax which differs from that calculated by the IRS (or a state taxation
authority) in an audit situation. Where an employee (or spouse thereof) operates
a business venture, the potential for audit is obviously enhanced. The potential for
abuse in this area is all the more relevant where the government employee's agency
is the IRS itself, in view of the particularly rigid standards to which IRS employees
are held in their own tax affairs. 1
32
G. Encouraging and Facilitating the Filing of Returns by Government Employees
Given the strong governmental interest in having all Government employees
discharge their personal tax obligations, it would be most appropriate for the
Government to encourage and facilitate voluntary compliance among its
workforce. 133 In practice, however, the Government does not always meet that
ideal.
For reasons of efficiency, the IRS has sought to encourage the electronic filing
of personal income tax returns.134 The IRS was able to clearly link its providing
means for its employees to electronically file their personal income tax returns with
131 Kooi, 517 N.Y.S. 2d at 601.
132 For discussion of the "Berthod standard" applied to employees of the IRS, see supra
note 43 and accompanying text.
133 Cf. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 778 (Edwin Cannan, ed., Modem Amer.
Library 1937) (1789), Book V, Chapt. II, Pt. II at 778 ("[Maxim number] IlI. Every tax
ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in which it is most likely to be convenient
for the contributor to pay it .").
'3 See, e.g., GEN. ACCT. OFF., REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRS, TAX ADMINISTRATION: FILING FALLING SHORT OF EXPECTATIONS REPORT No.
GAO/GGD-96-12 (Oct. 31, 1995) available in LEXIS 95 TNT 226-33; Ryan J. Donmoyer,
Richardson: TaxLink Users will Merge Automatically with EFTPS, TAX NOTES TODAY Dec.
4, 1996, at 1147, available in LEXIS 96 TNT 235-2 (IRS Commissioner has high
expectations for increases in Electronic Federal Tax Payment System usage). Congress has
adopted and endorsed the IRS objective to maximize the electronic filing of tax returns
through the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 105-206,
Act §§ 2001-03, 112 Stat. 783 (1998).
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its tax-related mission, and was accordingly granted permission by the Comptroller
General to use appropriated funds for the same.135 The fact that the individual IRS
employees would derive personal benefit from the program was determined by the
Comptroller General to be merely incidental to the IRS benefit.
36
On the other hand, agencies other than the IRS were not permitted to use
appropriated funds to provide their employees with means for electronic filing,
absent statutory authority or a demonstration that such a program would be
reasonably related to the agency's purposes and mission.
137
The Comptroller General's reluctance to permit agencies to expend
appropriated funds to facilitate employee tax return filings is somewhat puzzling.
Government agencies regularly make provisions for their employees to participate,
on government time and with government facilities, in personal activities such as
voting, Savings Bond campaigns, blood donations, charity drives, and jury
service. 38 Government agencies are specifically permitted to use appropriated
funds to purchase publications such as the Federal Employees News Digest and the
Federal Employees Almanac. 39 For some reason, however, there is a deep-seated
135 71 Comp. Gen. 28 (1991).
[Electronic filing] will facilitate IRS tax collection efforts by improving its
efficiency in processing returns, and will result in cost savings to the government,
both in the processing of returns and the training of employees. Further, the
program will allow the IRS to demonstrate the feasibility and accuracy of the
technology, thus, promoting corporate sponsorship of employee electronic filing
systems and encouraging the public-at-large to accept a new mechanism for filing
returns.
Id. at 30.
136 Id.
131 Comptroller General's Opin. No. B-259947 (Nov. 28, 1995), available in 1995 WL
697995 (C.G.).
138 See, e.g. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, NATIONAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE AND NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION Arts. 31.1 at 52:36 at 57-
58 (IRS Document 6647, July 1989) (hereinafter NORD III); AGREEMENT BETWEEN STATE
OF WISCONSIN AND AFSCME COUNCIL 24, WISCONSIN STATE EMPLOYEES UNION,
AFL-CIO Art. 11, § 20 at 120-21 (administrative leave time for employee blood donations),
Art. 13, § 11 at 157-5 8 (jury service or appearance as a witness), Art. 13, § 12 at 158 (voting
time). During the author's employment with the Federal government, he had occasion to
"voluntarily" serve as the representative in his work group for the Savings Bond Drive and
the Combined Federal Campaign, and, while serving in a supervisory position for the
Federal government, to designate subordinates who "volunteered" for those same duties as
such representatives.
139 55 Comp. Gen. 1076 (1976).
[Vol. 31:3,4
34
Akron Law Review, Vol. 31 [1998], Iss. 3, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol31/iss3/1
OF TAXES AND DUTIES
reluctance, if not resistance, to allowing government employees similar use of
governmental resources in order to attend to their personal tax affairs. 4 °
IV. CONCLUSION:
It is clear that the tax law is growing increasingly complex.' 4' As the tax laws
become increasingly complex, more and more citizens will become entangled in tax
traps and the voluntary compliance rate among the population will decrease. 42
Moreover, discord and dysfunction within the taxation bureaucracies can only
increase with the complexity of the tax law.
43
140 Cf. United States Army Tank Automotive Command and AFGE Local 1659, 93 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 767, 769 (Smith, Arb., 1989) The Army attempted to discipline a civilian
employee for entering a personal "tax program" on a government computer. Id. "A
supervisor credibly testified that he would have been against the decision to demote except
that a tax program was involved. He was unaware that it was irrelevant that a tax program
was involved." Id. But cf. NORD II, supra note 138, Art. 31.4 at 58, which provides that
IRS employees be accorded administrative leave to attend to personal tax audits.
141 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
142 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
143 See Adam Smith, supra note 133.
[Maxim] H. The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain and
not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid,
ought to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person. Where it
is otherwise, every person subject to the tax is put more or less in the power of the
tax-gatherer, who can either aggravate the tax upon any obnoxious contributor, or
extort, by the terror of such aggravation, some present or perquisite to himself.
The uncertainty of taxation encourages the insolence and favours the corruption of
an order of men who are naturally unpopular, even where they are neither insolent
nor corrupt. The certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a
matter of so great importance, that a very considerable degree of inequality, it
appears, I believe, from the experience of all nations, is not near so great an evil as
a very small degree of uncertainty.
Id. at 778.
Recent events have indicated that Smith's admonition remains valid today. As an
example, the IRS is specifically prohibited from evaluating the performance of tax collection
personnel on the basis of dollars collected. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of
1988 ("TAMRA"), Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6231, 102 Stat. at 3342, reprinted at 1988-3 C.B.
394. Nevertheless, a decade after the enactment of that provision, it was found to be
frequently honored in the breach, with the consequent abuses to the taxpayer. See, e.g., IRS
Quota Use Widespread, NEWSDAY, Jan. 15, 1998, at A50. Indeed, serious questions remain
as to whether the IRS is able to meaningfully control the abuse of taxpayers by its own
employees and agents. See, e.g., GEN. ACCT. OFF., PUB. No. GAO/T-GGD-98-63, TAx
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Accordingly, the incidence and saliency of public employees' special tax law
compliance obligations issues can be expected to increase in the coming years. At
least two factors will likely give such issues increased exposure. First of all, the
increasing numbers of individuals who run afoul of the tax laws will sweep across
all segments of society and will likely include public employees along with
everyone else. Secondly, there will be increased pressures upon governmental
agencies and offices to take all necessary measures to promote voluntary
compliance. 1" Government agencies will thus find it increasingly difficult to
ignore the issue, regardless of whether the Internal Revenue Code, as we know it
today, remains in force.
Both internal managerial and external public image concerns dictate that
government agencies first bring order to their own houses. Accordingly, making
an example of an errant employee will likely prove to be a convenient and effective
way to address both internal and external imperatives to promote voluntary
compliance with the tax laws.
In enforcing order within their own camps, government agencies will need to
be mindful of employee privacy and due process rights. Some sort of balance must
be struck. The intramural and/or public disclosure of the fact that a given employee
has or has not timely filed his or her tax returns, without disclosing any information
from the tax returns themselves, would serve well to encourage voluntary
compliance among agency personnel and the public while honoring the law-abiding
employee's personal rights.
ADMINISTRATION: IRS INSPECTION SERVICE AND TAXPAYER ADVOCATE ROLES FOR
ENSURING THAT TAXPAYERS ARE TREATED PROPERLY (Feb. 5, 1998), available in LEXIS
98 TNT 25-32 (testimony before Senate Committee on Finance by Lynda D. Willis,
Director, Tax Policy & Admin. Issues).
For its part, the United States Congress has long had the propensity to knowingly
legislate statutes which exacerbate the uncertainty of computing the amount of tax due and
owing. In Edwards v. Slocum, 287 F. 651, 654 (2d Cir. 1923), aff'd, 264 U.S. 61 (1924),
decided two decades prior to the invention of the automatic sequence electronic computer,
the court found that Congress did not intend to necessitate the use of a complex interrelated
mathematical calculation in computing the amount of the Federal estate tax. Id. at 654.
Shortly following the Supreme Court's affirmation, Congress rejected such rationale in
enacting the Revenue Act of 1924. See S.398, 68th Cong., lst Sess. 35, reprinted in 1939-1
C.B. (pt. 2) 266, 290.
14 GEN. ACCT. OFF., PuB. No. GAOIT-GGD-97-35, TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE:
ANALYZING THE NATURE OF THE INCOME TAX GAP 1 (Mar. 1997) (Complex tax laws can
lead to more noncompliance by taxpayers.).
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Ricardo observed that taxation "frequently operates very differently from the
intention of the legislature by its indirect effects."'45 The implication of public
employees into disputes and disciplinary procedures on account of personal taxation
matters is surely an indirect effect of taxation which does not match the intent and
expectations of Congress.
The issue of public employee compliance with the tax laws cannot be expected
to go away any time soon. To the contrary, it can be expected to pose many
challenges to both tax administration and public personnel administration. During
the uncertain times ahead, federal and state government agencies and offices which
educate their employees as to the tax law obligations and facilitate the filing of tax
returns, in a manner respectful of the employees' privacy rights, will serve the best
interests of the employee, agency and public alike.
14' DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 157 (J.
M. Dent & Sons 1969) (1817); also printed in 1 THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF
DAVID RICARDO 239 (Piero Sraffa, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1951).
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